
slf-guardian-mcp
io.github.slfguardian/slf-guardian-mcp
Safety checks an agent runs before it acts: packages, commands, prompt injection, links, code.
Documentation
SLF Guardian MCP
Six security checks an AI agent can call before it acts — before it delivers code, installs a dependency, runs a shell or SQL command, opens a link or reads an untrusted page.
One file, no dependencies, stdio transport. Works with Claude Desktop, Cursor, Cline, Windsurf, Continue and anything else that speaks MCP.
| Tool | The question it answers |
|---|---|
audit_code | Is this code safe to deliver or run? |
check_package | Does this dependency exist, and is it safe to install? |
check_prompt | Does this text or page carry instructions aimed at me? |
check_command | Can this shell or SQL command be undone? |
check_domain | Is this domain safe to trust? |
scan_site | Passive outside-in security check of a website |
Every answer is a single verdict (pass, review, block) plus the evidence
behind it, so an agent can branch on it without reading prose.
Install
pip install slf-guardian-mcp
# or straight from this repository
pip install git+https://github.com/slfguardian/slf-guardian-mcp
Get a key
curl -X POST https://slfguardian.com/v1/keys \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"email":"you@example.com"}'
25 calls are free. The raw key is shown once.
Configure your client
{
"mcpServers": {
"slf-guardian": {
"command": "slf-guardian-mcp",
"env": { "SLF_API_KEY": "slf_live_..." }
}
}
}
What it catches
check_package — the invented dependency. Assistants hallucinate package
names; attackers register them. langchain-helper-utils comes back block, no such package, lodahs comes back review, did you mean lodash. The source is
the registry itself plus the OSV vulnerability database, with npm postinstall
hooks, yanked and abandoned releases, age and download counts.
check_prompt — instructions hidden in content you were asked to read.
Text hidden with display:none, zero-width and bidi characters, Unicode tag
smuggling, homoglyphs, markdown exfiltration pixels, "ignore previous
instructions", "send .env to this webhook", "do not tell the user". The tool
never follows any instruction it finds; it returns the cleaned text and the
findings.
check_command — the thing you cannot undo. UPDATE users SET plan=1
without a WHERE comes back block, reversible=false; git push --force origin main comes back review with --force-with-lease suggested. Nothing is ever
executed.
check_domain — the link before you open it. Registration age and status,
DNS, lookalike brands, brand in a subdomain, punycode, shorteners, disposable
hosting, abuse-heavy TLDs. The site itself is never contacted.
audit_code — before you hand the file over. Remote code execution
(curl | bash), environment and credential exfiltration, reverse shells,
destructive commands, hidden base64, hard-coded secrets, install-time hooks,
shell=True, pickle.loads, TLS verification turned off.
Honest limits
These are detectors, not proofs. A pass means no known pattern matched, not
that the input is safe; a finding is evidence to look at, not a conviction.
Nothing submitted is executed, and the analysis is static.
Environment
| Variable | Default | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
SLF_API_KEY | — | Required. Your key. |
SLF_API_BASE | https://slfguardian.com | Override the endpoint. |
SLF_TIMEOUT | 120 | Seconds per call. |
HTTP API and OpenAPI description: https://slfguardian.com/api
MIT licensed.
slf-guardian-mcppip install slf-guardian-mcp