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pricklypair

io.github.colony-technology/pricklypair

npx pricklypair | FIDO, passkey, dice checkpoints; operation approvals; agent grants

Documentation

pricklypair

npx pricklypair · brew install colony-technology/tap/pricklypair

$7/month: https://buy.stripe.com/dRmcN491I2kf2bM2RB6c00c

Source: https://github.com/colony-technology/pricklypair

Naming invariant: spell the product pricklypair in lowercase in all source, API surfaces, documentation and published copy.

Public, inspectable source for the colony.technology pricklypair product. The repository contains experimental security code, reproducible checks and source receipts.

One authorization interface for many separate keys, any finite permission graph, and many credential surfaces. The owner-selected product price is $7 USD/month, one complete plan for individuals, agents and institutions. No add-on tiers. Payment collection is not active in the preview. The experience is a single API request for humans, AI agents and infrastructure. Independent signers check the complete operation and policy before producing a standard per-protocol signature and a portable proof receipt.

The primitive

North: an authorized caller describes what an operation must do. South: an independent decoder derives what the exact operation bytes will do. Seam: a retained observation boundary verifies north and south equivalence, mirrored chart consistency, policy approval, replay state and threshold signer authorization. Every signer checks the contract locally.

The current mathematical basis is the formally proved Unifier quotient and Winding and Mirrored involution. The mirror identity provides a public, exact consistency witness. Cryptographic isolation comes from reviewed threshold signature shares across independent systems, not from a hidden mirror coordinate.

Each tenant can register arbitrarily many separately scoped key groups. Nested policies combine all, any and t-of-n actors and signers; policies may require several key groups jointly. One visible identity can manage many RP-specific passkeys, wallets and roles without reusing one cryptographic secret across incompatible protocols.

Threat-model objective: replace physical air-gap procedures for a declared threshold-compromise model through continuously connected, independently governed signers. Legacy authenticator constraints, hardware user presence and third-party controls still apply.

Repository

Observed reference execution

Run python3 examples/authority_fabric.py. The in-repository model passes 4 separate key groups, 2 individual authorizations, 1 atomic two-key authorization, 6 adversarial rejection cases, distinct-actor quorum enforcement and 2,728 exact mirror-index involution checks. It emits no cryptographic signature; signer approvals are simulated inputs. An earlier Chat research note described 450 toy finite-field signatures, but its executable and receipt were not reproduced in this repository; those historical numbers are excluded from the current acceptance record.

Research receipt: public synchronization and quantum access

The new public_sync_socket.swift reference sends an identical 467-byte public coordinate to multiple hypothetical clients and verifies that no authorization follows from the coordinate itself. Fresh operation-bound Ed25519 device signatures allow an approved session; eleven invalid requests are rejected. Its hardware and receiver-channel identity are simulated and must be verified on real authenticators.

The quantum-permission compiler checked all 189 nonconstant monotone policies on up to four devices, providing a no-cloning-compatible decomposition. The q=5 2-of-3 quantum secret sharing state-vector simulator verified 75 single-share independence equations and 15 coherent decoder equations. This is conventional quantum secret sharing mathematics composed into a new product research design, with no quantum hardware yet.

Working developer preview (0.2.0)

The public installation page is colony.technology/pricklypair. The operator runs the worker on its own machine and gives a recipient a single temporary link to add a FIDO key, phone passkey or dice-derived checkpoint. The same CLI can initiate a physically approved agent delegation and then accept fresh Ed25519-signed actions from that agent, limited to operation, audience, resource, declared environment, time, amount, use count and revocation. No customer signup or centrally hosted key vault.

The experimental local vault stores AES-256-GCM encrypted JSON credentials and supports explicitly requested X25519 sealed export. If a credential reaches an untrusted agent, that agent can copy it. The preferred future full password-manager route uses verified service-specific brokers instead of exporting raw reusable credentials. Browser autofill, real provider login, vault recovery/backup, passkey management across all relying parties and independent security audit are open engineering gates. The preview has no production security certification. The owner set a single $7 USD/month subscription; checkout and customer-independent license receipts must use the verified colony Stripe account.

Run npm test for two complete HTTP journeys, and node test/browser-journey.mjs on a Mac with Brave/Chromium to exercise virtual-FIDO registration and authorization.

Product gate

A production version requires reviewed FROST/DKG or equivalent protocol-compatible threshold signing, independent signer hosts, raw transaction decoders with source-bound equality checks, secure hardware/OS integration where required, a recovery process, a full adversarial assessment, real signature verification and independent pilot acceptance.

Current status: public research and executable self-hosted developer preview; no production signing security certification, no verified revenue, and no completed physical-device acceptance. This README is the source of truth for product scope. See CURRENT.md for the next cursor.

No installation packages available.